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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 




LAWRENCE MORRIS, Warden, 
Utah State Prison, and 
THOMAS R. HARRISON, Chairman, 
Utah State Board of Pardons, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 16846 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
On January. 16, 1978, the appellant was convicted of 
aggravated robbery and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment 
of five years to life in the Utah State Prison. The appellant 
was then placed on probation and a stay of execution of sentence 
was granted until March 16, 1979. On June 1, 1979, after a 
hearing, the appellant's probation was revoked and he was 
conunitted to the Utah State Prison to serve his original 
sentence. On August 27, 1979, the appellant filed a petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus. The present action is an appeal 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
from an order granting the respondent's motion to dismiss 
and denying the petition for the issuance of the writ with 
prejudice. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On June 1, 1979, at a hearing held before the 
Honorable Jay E. Banks, the appellant's probation was revoked 
and he was committed to the Utah State Prison to serve an 
indeterminate term of from five years to life. On August 27, 
1979, the appellant filed a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus and a hearing was scheduled to convene before the 
Honorable David K. Winder. On October 25, 1979, both parties 
were ordered to file a memorandum on the issues involved. 
The respondent thereafter moved to dismiss the petition on 
the ground that it failed to state a claim upon which relief 
could be granted. On December 6, 1979 in a memorandum decision 
the Honorable David K. Winder granted the respondent's motion 
to dismiss on the grounds that the appellant's probation was 
properly revoked and that the record provided a sufficient 
written basis as to the evidence and reasons relied upon for 
revoking appellant's probation. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent seeks affirmance of the lower court's 
order granting the motion to dismiss the petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus, and affirmance of the trial court's order 
-2-
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revoking the appellant's probation. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On September 15, 1978, pursuant to a plea of guilty 
to the crime of aggravated robbery, the appellant was sentenced 
to a term of imprisonment of from five years to life by the 
Honorable Jay E. Banks (R. at 27). The execution of the sen-
tence was stayed and the appellant was placed on probation 
conditioned on several factors, one of which being that he 
have no weapons in his possession (R. at 27) . 
On or about May 6, 2979, Salt Lake City police officers 
had occasion to observe the appellant outside of the Elks Club 
(T. at 3). At that time, the officers had observed the appel-
lant urinating on the side of the building (T. at 3). The 
officers then called the appellant over to the patrol car where 
he was briefly searched and informed that he was being placed 
under arrest for obscene conduct (T. at 4,5,15). The appellant 
was then transported to the Salt Lake County jail by officers 
James Yontz and Kevin Kenna; Officer Yontz was driving, the 
appellant was sitting in the front passenger seat, and Officer 
Kenna was sitting in the back seat behind the appellant (T. at 
27, 28). Upon arrival at the jail, the front passenger door 
was opened and the appellant was assisted out of the car. It 
was at that time that Officer Yontz noticed a gun on the floor 
of the car between the front passenger's seat and the door 
(T. at 6, 28). Later, at the appellant's probation 
-3-
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revocation hearing, it was adduced that although the officers 
had transported another person sitting in that same seat, to 
the jail, a search of the seating area previous to the time 
the appellant had been picked up, failed to yield the exist-
ence of the gun. (T. at 24, 26). It was not until after appel-
lant was taken to the jail, that the weapon was discovered. 
There after on May 14, 1979, the appellant's pro-
bation agent filed an affidavit stating that the appellant 
had violated the conditions of his probation by having been 
in possession of a firearm on or about May 6, 1979 in violation 
of U.C.A. § 76-10-503, and by having concealed upon his person 
a firearm in violation of U.C.A. § 76-10-504. On May 17, 1979 
an order to show cause issued and a hearing was scheduled for 
May 21, 1979. At that hearing, the appellant denied the 
allegations and the hearing was continued to May 29, 1979 and 
June 1, 1979 at which time the court found the appellant to 
be in violation of the terms of his probation. The court then 
ordered the appellant committed to the Utah State Prison to 
serve his original sentence. A transcript of the probation 
revocation proceedings was appropriately preserved. 
On July 31, 1979, the appellant came to trial on the 
alleged violations of U.C.A. § 76-10-503 and U.C.A. § 76-10-504 
before the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin. After the jury was 
-4-
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sworn, count two of the information was dismissed, and the 
appellant pleaded not guilty. On August 1, 1979, the jury 
found the appellant not guilty. 
On August 27, 1979 the appellant filed a petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that he had been uncon-
stitutionally detained since he had been subsequently acquitted 
of the charges which were the basis of his probation revocation, 
and the court erred in not entering written findings of fact 
(R. at 2, 3, 4). On October 25, 1979, the Honorable David K. 
Winder ordered each party to file a memorandum on the issues 
involved (R. at 10). Both parties complied with this order 
and subsequently thereto, the respondent filed a motion to 
dismiss on November 27, 1979 (R. at 23). On December 6, 1979 
the court, in a memorandum decision, granted the respondent's 
motion to dismiss and denied with prejudice the issuance of 
the writ (R. at 24, 25). The court stated that it found the 
appellant's probation to have been properly revoked and the 
record of the revocation hearing to be a sufficient written 
basis as to the reasons relied upon for revocation to meet 
due process requirements (R. at 24). The court subsequently 
on December 19, 1979 entered findings of fact and conclusions 
of law resulting from the habeas corpus proceedings (R. at 26, 
27, 28, 29). The court then entered the appropriate order 
(R. at 30, 31). 
-5-
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ARGUMENT 
APPELLANT WAS PROPERLY DENIED HABEAS 
CORPUS RELIEF BECAUSE THERE WAS NO 
SUBSTANTIAL DENIAL OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS WHEN NO WRITTEN FINDINGS WERE 
ENTERED BY THE TRIAL JUDGE IN REVOKING 
APPELLANT'S PROBATION. 
The United States Supreme Court in Morrissey v. 
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972), held that before parole 
may be revoked, certain minimum requirements of due process 
must be met. The Court stated that these requirements include: 
[(A)] written notice of the claimed 
violations of par6le; (b) disclo~ure 
to the parolee of evidence against 
him; (c) opportunity to be heard in 
person and to present witnesses and 
documentary evidence; (d) the right 
to confront and cross-examine adverse 
witnesses (unless the hearing officer 
specifically finds good cause for not 
allowing confrontation) ; (e) a "neutral 
and detached" hearing body such as a 
traditional parole board, members of 
wh~ch need not be judicial officers or 
lawyers; and (f) a written statement 
by the fact finders as to the evidence 
relied on and reasons for revoking parole. 
Such requirements were adopted by the United States Supreme 
Court in Gagnon v. Scarpelli,411 U.S. 778 (1973), and applied 
to probation revocation hearings. Id at 786. Accordingly, 
since the Court found that the revocation of probation is 
constitutionally indistinguishable from the revocation of 
parole (see footnote 3 at 782), it (the Court) applied the 
-6-
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language used in Morrissey to probation revocation proceedings. 
The Court in Morrissey said of the requirements for parole 
revocation that: "We have no thought to create an inflexible 
structure for parole revocation procedures." (at 490). So 
too may this language be applied to probation revocation 
procedures. 
Nevertheless Respondent submits that the requirement 
that the court provide written findings of the facts relied 
upon for revoking probation was fulfilled by the court's 
verbal statement and hearing transcript. 
It is important to note that the holdings in 
Morrissey and Gagnon resulted from decisions of revocation 
made by administrative boards of probation and parole, not 
by judicial hearing bodies. In most cases, the probationer 
or parolee did not have the benefit of the assistance of 
counsel at such hearings. The court therefore held that 
these administrative boards were to provide written findings 
of fact to the accused to aid him in prosecuting an appeal to 
a court of review. The case at bar presents a distinguishable 
setting from earlier precedents. In the instant case, the 
hearing was had before a judicial officer, a judge, and the 
appellant was represented by trained counsel. When presented 
with these circumstances, the court in People v. Scott, App., 
110 Cal. Rptr. 402, 405, 406, (1973) made the following reply 
-7-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
where the appellant's sole contention was that he was denied 
due process since no written findings were made: 
The proceedings held in open court 
in the case at bench which have been 
recorded by the official reporter serve 
the same purpose . . . (at 405) 
It is obvious that the circumstances 
that require written findings in a parole 
revocation proceeding in a prison do not 
obtain in a hearing held in open court, 
which has been fully reported, and where 
the usual constitutional right to counsel 
has been given. 
We hold that in a proceeding for 
revocation of probation the making of 
written findings of fact is not an indis-
pensible concomitant of due process if 
there is a substantially equivalent substitute 
therefore, such as appears from the official 
reporter's transcript of the oral proceedings 
in the case at bench, and that the defendant 
here was not deprived of due process. (at 406). 
The court in State v. Jaworski, 234 N.W.2d 221, 222, 223 (Neb. 
1975) came to the same conclusion in its analysis of Morrissey 
and Gagnon: 
Morrissey and Gagnon were applied to 
a form of administrative hearing. They 
did not directly deal with judicial pro-
. bation and judicial revocation as provided 
in the Nebraska Probation Administration 
Act . . . The Morrissey and Gagnon require-
ment of a written statement does not fit the 
pattern of a judicial hearing in a court of 
record where proceedings, findings, and 
judgments are recorded and subject to appellate 
review. The differences are further emphasized 
where a specific charge or information is 
filed by a prosecutor, and the defendant is 
represented by counsel. It would be strange 
indeed if the formal requirements of fact 
finding and determination of guilt were to 
-8-
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be more strict at a probation revocation 
hearing than at an original criminal trial. 
Neither the Nebraska Probation Admini-
stration Act nor Morrissey or Gagnon require 
the District Court to specify which exhibits 
or which witnesses were relied upon for its 
written findings. 
The respondent's position is further supported by the con-
clusion reached in State v. Fortier, Ore. App., 533 P.2d 187 
(1975) where the court stated that: 
After analyzing the arguments of 
both counsel we have come to the same 
conclusion reached in Moreno, namely, 
that a written statement of the evidence 
is not required under the circumstances 
here . . Inasmuch as there was a full 
record of the evidence and prodeedings on 
which the Lane County Circuit Court based 
its decision to revoke probation in this 
case, there was no necessity to require 
the court to give defendant a written 
statement of the evidence upon which the 
court's action was based. 
See also State v. Moreno, Ariz. App., 520 P.2d 1139 (1974), and 
State v. Marlar, Ariz. App., 511 P .. 2d 204 (1974), State v. McFarlar 
238 N.W.2d 237 (Neb. 1976). The Washington State Supreme Court ir. 
State v. Myers, 545 P.2d 538, 544 (Wash. 1976), not only spoke 
directly to the issue, but also spoke directly to the appellant's 
relief sought on appeal when it stated: 
The appellant's second argument 
is that he was denied due process by 
the failure of the judge at the rev-
ocation hearing to make written findings 
of fact. This contention, however, does 
not stand scrutiny because the judge's 
-9-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
oral opinion, transcribed in the 
statement of facts, provides an 
ample record of the evidence on 
which the judge relied and the 
reasons for the revocation. Thus, 
the absence of specific written 
findings did not hinder appellant 
in making his appeal since the oral 
opinion provided a record sufficient 
for review. A remand for the purpose 
of entering formal written findings 
would serve no useful purpose. Under 
these circumstances, the failure to 
enter written findings of fact did 
not result in a denial of appellant's 
due process rights. 
Thus the respondent submits that these authorities 
are dispositive of the sole issue posed by the appellant's 
brief. Moreover, even if this Court should find that the 
trial court's failure to enter special written findings, was 
error, the error was harmless and does not render the pro-
bation revocation hearing invalid. Utah Code Ann. § 77-53-2 
states that: "Neither a departure from the form or mode 
prescribed by this Code in respect to any pleading or proceedin 
shall render it invalid unless it shall have actually prejudice 
the defendant in respect to a substantial right." The appellan 
alleges no such prejudice to a substantial right. Furthermore, 
the appellant himself explicitly shows that no such prejudice 
occurred since it is obvious from his petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus that the appellant had been adequately informed c 
the reasons why his probation was revoked (R. at 2, 3, 4). 
-10-
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The appellant tacitly concedes that, with the 
exception of the issue at bar, his due process rights were 
fully protected at the revocation hearing: the appellant had 
notice of the alleged grounds for revocation by the affidavit 
and order to show cause; he was present with counsel at the 
hearing where he presented a defense and called and cross-
examined witnesses; the hearing was before a neutral and 
detached judicial officer;and, the appellant was sufficiently 
apprised as to why his probation had been revoked by the 
judge and the hearing transcript. 
The appellant cites no valid authorities in support 
of his argument that his due process rights were violated. 
The appellant's reliance on this Court's ruling in Farrell v. 
Turner, 25 Utah 2d 351, 482 P.2d 117 (1971), is misplaced. 
That case involved a woman who pleaded guilty to a violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-50-6. The trial court there suspended 
the execution of the sentence and placed the defendant on 
probation for a period of two years. Soon thereafter the 
conditions of probation were violated and after notice and 
hearing, the defendant's probation was revoked. The defendant 
then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and there-
after appealed from its dismissal. The opinion of the court 
in upholding the dismissal of the petition, refers to Rule 
52(a), U.R.C.P. and specifically to findings of fact in 
-11-
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habeas corpus proceedin~s. This Court never meant to require 
the blanket application of a rule mandating that special 
written findings of fact be entered in all types of proceedings 
The opinion was limited in its application to habeas corpus 
proceedings. Thus, since the court in the habeas corpus 
proceedings in the present case promulgated special written 
findings of fact and conclusions of law (R. at 26, 27, 28, 29), 
there is no merit to the appellant's reliance on the authority 
he has cited. 
The appellant further misplaces his reliance on 
Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336 (Utah 1979) which was an appeal 
from a civil dispute between a home-owner and a non-licensed 
contractor he had hired to construct an addition to his home. 
When it was found that much of the work on the house was done 
in an unworkrnanlike manner, the home~owner filed a suit for 
damages. The trial court awarded the home-owner two thousand 
dollars in damages and he appealed seeking an increase in the 
award. The trial court in that case did file specific findings 
of fact but this Court remanded the case for additional finding 
since the findings of record were not sufficiently detailed to 
allow the Court to decide the issue. 
As can readily be observed~ the authority the appella 
has cited has no application to the issue here in question. 
-12-
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CONCLUSION 
The respondent maintains that the appellant's due 
process rights were respected in every way during the pro-
bation revocation proceedings. In view of the authorities 
cited and the arguments set forth, the appellant has failed 
to show the commission of a reversible error by the trial 
judge in not making specific findings of fact and specific 
findings of the reasons for revocation of the appellant's 
probation. In view of the fact that existing statutory law 
and case law was complied with at every step of the pro-
ceedings, the judgment of the lower court must be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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